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The Case for the 
Unstructured Audit Approach 
Jerry D. Sullivan 
Coopers & Lybrand 
In their recently completed study of the audit methodologies of 12 large 
accounting firms—the Big Eight plus four of the next six largest firms—Cushing 
and Loebbecke analyzed the firms in terms of the amount of structure in their 
audit approaches and then classified the firms as "highly structured," "semi-
structured," "partially structured," or "unstructured."1 Based on the 
characteristics of a structured approach, as that term is defined in the study 
and discussed below, I hope that Coopers & Lybrand falls into the "partially 
structured" category, which could also be called the "mostly unstructured" 
category. It's interesting to note that when C&L revised its audit approach in 
1969, to what was the forerunner of our present approach, we called it the 
Uniform Audit Approach, thinking at the time that it was one of the most 
structured approaches in the profession. Today, those same initials—UAA— 
might be used to identify the "Unstructured Audit Approach." 
Cushing and Loebbecke define a structured audit methodology as "a 
systematic approach to auditing characterized by a prescribed, logical sequence 
of procedures, decisions, and documentation steps, and by a comprehensive 
and integrated set of audit policies and tools designed to assist the auditor in 
conducting the audit." Using that definition, it's hard to be against a structured 
audit approach; to favor an unstructured approach seems almost subversive. I 
would like to suggest, however, that merely calling the two polar positions by 
other names would go a long way toward removing what some symposium 
participants probably view as the stigma of an unstructured approach. For 
example, in addressing what are essentially the same issues, Dirsmith and 
McAllister2 use the terms "mechanistic" and "organic" instead of "struc-
tured" and "unstructured." I would much rather be associated with an 
approach that is viewed as organic than one that is referred to as unstructured. 
On the other hand, I am sure that many auditors who take pride in their firms' 
structured approaches would resent those approaches being referred to as 
mechanistic. 
There is a range of audit approaches between the two polar positions of 
"structured" and "unstructured." I have already indicated that we thought 
our approach was fairly structured when we first developed it. When I read the 
Cushing-Loebbecke definition of a structured audit approach, I again thought 
that our approach fit that definition. We always have believed that our approach 
is systematic, comprehensive, and integrated—as those terms are typically 
used. It's only when I see how far some firms have carried the notions of 
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systematic, comprehensive, and integrated that I jump off the structure 
bandwagon. 
Classifying Firms' Policies 
The Cushing-Loebbecke draft constructed a set of questions in an attempt 
to identify a CPA firm's "potential policies for each audit process step" that 
they identified in the study.3 They provided three alternative answers for each 
question "which relate to the possible degree of structure a firm may feel is 
appropriate." The set of answers that placed heavy emphasis on a structured 
approach included the following possible policies (emphasis added): 
1. All potential new clients would be investigated to the same extent. 
2. All audit areas would be audited at a certain standard level of effort. 
3. A totally substantive approach to an audit or to one audit area would 
not be possible, and some detailed compliance tests would always be 
required. 
4. If the auditor wished to rely on internal control for one audit 
objective for one type of transaction, internal control would have to 
be relied on to meet all audit objectives for all types of transactions 
and related accounts. 
5. Statistical sampling would be used for all detailed tests. 
6. Materiality would be allocated to various audit areas using a 
statistical algorithm that totally ignored qualitative considerations. 
7. Inherent risk would not enter into the determination of the scope of 
audit procedures at all—that is, inherent risk would be set at 100 
percent—presumably because the evaluation and assessment of 
inherent risk are not susceptible to quantitative determination. 
Those potential policies that underlie a structured audit approach seem to 
suggest that the issue really isn't that of a structured approach versus an 
unstructured approach, but rather that of structure versus judgment. The two 
camps can also be divided into those auditors who believe that auditor judgment 
should be replaced by structured, quantitative algorithms and those who 
believe that the audit decision-making process cannot be reduced to a 
quantitative model but will always require the exercise of considerable 
judgment. Virtually every applied discipline faces this same issue of structure 
versus judgment; only the words used to describe the debate vary. For 
example, in the 1950s, the debate over the Federal Reserve's monetary policy 
with regard to regulating the relationship between the money supply and the 
level of economic activity was expressed in terms of "rules" versus "au-
thorities," rules being the equivalent of structure and authorities being the 
equivalent of the exercise of judgment on a continual basis by the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Open Market Committee. 
The Argument for Judgment 
I don't believe that any audits are conducted based on the policies 
suggested above as underlying a structured approach, nor do I believe that any 
auditing firm has a set of policies, or even individual policies, that contain the 
conclusions suggested by Cushing-Loebbecke as placing heavy emphasis on a 
structured approach. I do not see that as the issue, however. The issue, as I 
see it, is not where are we today? Rather, it is where are we going? Where will 
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we be 10 years from now if we continue to strive to remove judgment from the 
audit process, which seems to be a goal that some auditors support? Coopers 
& Lybrand, and I'm sure this is true for all firms, seeks an audit approach that 
helps the auditor perform an effective audit in the most efficient manner. We do 
not characterize our approach as being either structured or unstructured; in 
fact, we don't characterize it at all other than as the Coopers & Lybrand Audit 
Approach, which I believe is far more advisable than having to defend or adhere 
to one of the polar positions of structured or unstructured. 
As part of our thinking about how to serve audit clients most efficiently, 
C&L has classified its clients into a few market segments and has developed 
different audit strategies for each of those segments—audit strategies that can 
be changed as client conditions warrant. For example, our guidance for an audit 
of a Fortune 500 client presumes that the control environment would support 
auditor testing and reliance on controls; our guidance for audits of smaller 
clients presumes that audit efficiency will be enhanced by using a purely 
substantive test mode. In both cases, however, the methodology is sufficiently 
flexible—that is, unstructured—to allow the engagement partner to follow an 
alternative strategy if it is deemed to be the most efficient way of performing an 
effective audit. 
Audit Effectiveness 
On the issue of audit effectiveness, my great fear is that a structured audit 
approach that is based completely on quantitative algorithms is likely to 
produce substandard audits, for a very simple reason—the incompleteness of 
the linkage between the results of compliance tests and the nature, timing, and 
extent of substantive tests. I do not believe that the technology currently 
exists to enable auditors to determine with any reasonable level of assurance 
what specific substantive tests should be performed and how much detailed 
substantive testing should be done based on specified results of specific 
compliance tests of internal controls. Even if inherent risk were set at 100 
percent and even if no reliance were placed on the results of analytical reviews 
in the substantive test phase of the audit—so that audit risk would be reduced 
to an acceptable level solely through the application of compliance and detailed 
substantive tests—I do not believe that an algorithm exists to permit a precise 
and unarguable specification of the nature and amount of substantive testing 
that should be performed, given the results of compliance test procedures in a 
particular transaction cycle. Short of an arbitrary rule, no way exists of 
determining, even on a statistical or probability basis, what the precise level of 
a particular substantive test should be. 
For example, if I concluded after applying statistical sampling to all key 
controls over sales and cash receipts that I was 95 percent confident that the 
true deviation rate for each control did not exceed 8 percent, what would that 
tell me about the size of the sample for confirming accounts receivable? How 
would that sample size change if sampling risk dropped to 1 percent? If the 
upper deviation limit dropped to 6 percent? I don't think it can be done. 
Auditors have neither the theory nor the technology to link the rate at which 
control deviations occur and sampling risk in compliance testing with the 
desired level of reliability in substantive testing. As a result, we cannot be 
confident that an audit structured completely on quantitative algorithms will 
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generate a sample size large enough to give us the level of reliability necessary 
to comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
There is another extremely important aspect of the audit decision-making 
process to which a structured approach will not contribute: the judgments the 
auditor has to make, after the evidence has been obtained, about the 
appropriate application of generally accepted accounting principles in the 
client's particular circumstances. Decisions about whether the client has 
properly accounted for sales with the right of return, potential inventory 
obsolescence, and collectibility of receivables—to name just a few—are critical 
to an effective audit but are not subject to a structured methodology or a 
quantitative model. 
Audit Efficiency 
On the question of audit efficiency, the level of competition in the 
profession today mandates that we not overaudit. If we do too much, either the 
client pays for it and we risk losing the client to another firm, or we have to 
absorb the unbillable hours. Neither prospect is attractive. Accordingly, 
C&L—and I'm sure every other accounting firm—is extremely concerned 
about performing audits as efficiently as possible, which means expending the 
fewest possible hours to achieve the desired level of assurance. Let me 
suggest that there are four ways in which an overly structured audit 
methodology can lead to inefficiencies. 
First, as I indicated earlier, a highly structured methodology largely 
disregards the qualitative aspects of audit evidence that can and should have an 
impact on audit judgments. Most auditors who espouse structure are heavily 
quantitative and tend to ignore anything that can not be quantified. Among the 
factors that are ignored are levels of inherent risk that are below 100 percent 
and qualitative aspects of materiality that could serve to either increase or 
decrease the audit effort in specific areas. Also ignored is knowledge about the 
operation of controls that is obtained from nonsampling applications such as 
observation and inquiry, and tests of controls over completeness (for example, 
year-end reconciliations that are performed on a cumulative basis). I am not 
suggesting that statistical sampling applications are necessarily inappropriate; 
however, I am suggesting that sampling, and especially statistical sampling, is 
not appropriate for much evidence of considerable audit significance. I simply 
do not believe that an efficient audit can be performed if evidence of a 
qualitative nature is ignored. 
Second, the absence of linkage between substantive and compliance tests, 
which I mentioned earlier, can lead to inefficient as well as ineffective audits. In 
the absence of specific, quantitative guidance linking the nature and extent of 
substantive tests to compliance test findings, we are as likely to audit too much 
as to audit too little, and overauditing in one area doesn't offset the effects of 
underauditing in another area. The problems caused by the lack of precise 
linkage exist in both the structured and unstructured approaches and are not 
solved by increasing the level of structure in an audit. An unstructured 
approach at least allows the auditor to consider information obtained about a 
management assertion from tests other than the particular one under consid-
eration. After all, accounts and tests of those accounts are interrelated; audit 
evidence about any one assertion comes from multiple sources. 
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Third, I do not believe that any of the structured methodologies take into 
account, or can take into account, the audit efficiencies that ensue from what 
C&L refers to as the "leveraging" of evidence obtained through compliance 
tests. There are several ways to leverage evidence that C&L believes provide 
the auditor with a means of obtaining, from sources other than compliance 
tests, the necessary level of assurance about the continued and proper 
operation of controls. 
Leveraging Techniques 
By way of incorporating the leveraging technique, the C&L approach 
specifies that, to the extent possible and appropriate, some reperformance of 
control procedures is a necessary aspect of compliance testing. For example, 
assume an accounting control that consists of client personnel matching three 
documents, following up on unmatched documents, and initialing the docu-
ments. In testing that control the auditor should not only look for the initials but 
also reperform the matching. Similarly, the auditor should recalculate some 
extensions and footings if that is the control being compliance tested. 
Otherwise, the auditor has no assurance that the initials mean anything other 
than that the employee knows how to write his or her initials. Having 
reperformed the procedures and determined that the control operated on the 
items selected, the auditor can then obtain a higher level of assurance about the 
operation of the control by observing the operation of the procedure on 
numerous occasions and by examining evidence, namely the employee's 
initials, that the procedure was performed. In other words, once it has been 
established that the employee's initials do mean something, then compliance 
testing of those initials is appropriate, and that is a far less costly auditing 
procedure than reperforming calculations or matching documents. 
Similarly, C&L believes that the ability to rely on internal controls is 
enhanced if those controls are exercised in an environment that includes 
adequate supervisory review of their operation. We distinguish two different 
groups of controls: basic controls, which have to do with the control objectives 
of accuracy, validity, completeness, maintenance of account balances, and 
physical security, and disciplinary controls, which monitor the basic control 
procedures. Among the disciplinary controls is supervision. We believe that 
conclusions about the effectiveness of controls that are reached from com-
pliance tests performed before year-end can be extended throughout the year 
if supervisory controls exist and can be tested to determine if they operated 
during the untested period. Testing supervisory controls is relatively inexpen-
sive; it usually involves observation and reviewing error reports, such as 
computer printouts of rejected documents, that a supervisor may create and 
file. Recognizing a hierarchy of controls—which I do not think is included in any 
quantitative algorithm and probably can not be because there are so many 
variables involved—permits C&L to conduct a more efficient audit by eliminat-
ing some (but not all) of the compliance tests involving reperformance that, I 
believe, would otherwise be required for an audit in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards. 
Perhaps an illustration will be useful. The primary objective of any audit 
strategy is to provide the desired degree of protection against audit risk as 
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efficiently as possible. Assume that the audit objective at hand is to be able to 
conclude that recorded accounts receivable exist. A structured approach to 
examining a client's accounts receivable to achieve audit satisfaction regarding 
their existence is likely to center around the confirmation process, particularly 
deciding the appropriate sample size and how to evaluate the sample results, as 
a primary source of audit evidence. An unstructured approach would recognize 
that in reality, and depending on the circumstances of the particular client and 
its customers, the auditor may derive less comfort from the confirmation 
process than is commonly thought. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibili-
ties addressed this issue in its Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
(page 40): 
The Commission's review of significant cases involving auditors dis-
closed several instances in which certain traditional audit steps did not 
produce the assurances they were intended to provide. For example, 
direct confirmation with parties outside the company is an important 
method of substantiation of both financial statement amounts and other 
management representations. However, in several cases, outsiders 
either ignored incorrect information that was clearly shown in confirma-
tions or actively cooperated with management in giving incorrect 
confirmation. Constant attention should be given by both auditors and 
the AICPA to the effectiveness of conventional auditing techniques and 
to the development of new ones. 
Accordingly, the auditor would be well advised to look to other sources of 
evidence about the existence of the receivables. For example, the auditor 
could look to secondary sources of evidence by testing the functioning of the 
control system over shipping and billing, by determining by inquiry and 
observation that there is proper segregation of duties and adequate and 
continuing supervision over the basic controls in the revenue cycle, and by 
determining through analytical reviews that there are no unexplainable varia-
tions in the pattern of recorded sales and receivables. The auditor might also 
look to other primary sources of evidence for assessing the existence of an 
account receivable, such as examining subsequent cash receipts. All of these 
factors together may provide the necessary level of comfort for an auditor who 
uses an unstructured approach; not all of them are likely to be encompassed by 
the quantitative algorithm that is an integral part of a structured approach. 
Stated simply, deciding whether the appropriate sample size for confirmation 
should be 50 or 100 isn't nearly as important as the way the auditor integrates 
the knowledge obtained from all the other audit procedures that are likely to be 
performed. 
The Role of Compliance Tests 
Lastly, I noted earlier the Cushing-Loebbecke view that a compliance test 
audit strategy is usually part of a highly structured audit methodology. C&L's 
experience has been that, for many of our clients, an audit strategy of relying 
on controls is often inefficient. With the exception of the largest industrial and 
commercial companies and large- and medium-sized financial institutions, a 
substantive test strategy, supplemented by little more than the minimum level 
of understanding of the system that is required by the professional literature, is 
likely to produce a more efficient audit. Our methodology is not locked in on 
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this point, and we have not abandoned our long-standing attention to the 
client's control system. Each situation, however, should be looked at individu-
ally, and the partner should determine whether a completely substantive test 
approach would be more efficient for a particular client or a particular audit 
area. C&L also believes that, in considering the costs and benefits of a 
compliance test mode, the auditor must include cost and benefit factors that are 
not related to the specific engagement, such as staff hiring, availability, 
training, and retention. Even so, in many cases a strictly substantive test 
approach is more economical. An audit methodology that biases the auditor 
against reaching that conclusion is inappropriate, whether it's structured or 
unstructured. 
Decision Aids 
The apparently heavy emphasis on quantitative algorithms that is part of a 
highly structured approach seems to suggest that firms with structured 
approaches provide more "decision aids" to staff auditors than do firms with 
unstructured approaches. For example, one firm believes that the judgment-
making process is enhanced by providing its auditors with a formula for 
determining materiality. At C&L, we also provide decision aids to our staff—in 
fact, we believe that Montgomery's Auditing is the profession's best decision 
aid, and we have others as well—but we do so with great care, great restraint, 
much training, and many caveats. Decision aids can enhance audit judgment but 
can never replace it. Also, a decision aid should not be considered reliable 
solely because it has been formulated based on past practices. A decision aid 
that attempts to quantify a consensus without first ascertaining what the 
correct judgment should have been may well give the auditor who applies it 
what some have referred to as "the delusion of precision." 
Conclusion 
In summary, the research on error detection by Hylas and Ashton indicated 
that in many instances the auditor's first knowledge of a financial statement 
error came not through detailed tests that produced so-called hard audit 
evidence, but rather through such relatively soft procedures as discussions 
with the client, analytical reviews, and observation—hardly procedures that 
lend themselves to a great deal of structuring or to quantitative algorithms.4 
That study suggests that the auditor's decision-making process is much more 
complex than any quantitative model would suggest. 
In their study on audit methodologies, Cushing and Loebbecke suggest that 
many of the larger CPA firms have revised their audit methodologies in recent 
years and that the changes have generally been toward more structured 
approaches. They cite three motives for those changes: "(1) a need to 
implement a consistent approach across a large practice; (2) a need to control 
audit risk and audit costs more effectively; and (3) a desire to achieve a 
distinguishable image in the market place." I think a strong case can be made 
that those objectives can be achieved through an audit methodology that allows 
the auditor, based on an understanding of the client and industry, to exercise 
judgment in deciding what audit evidence is appropriate in the circumstances, 
whether to compliance test or not, and whether to consider more nonquantifia-
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ble evidence than a highly structured methodology would accommodate. The 
judgments the auditor must make in auditing under an unstructured approach 
are no different from those, particularly valuation judgments, that the auditor 
must ultimately make in assessing the overall fairness of financial statement 
presentation in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
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